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Introduction 
In the early twenty-first century, and looking beyond it, the landscapes of law’s operation are 
characterised by a growing degree of complexity and pressure. Law is called upon to coordinate 
relations in a world facing a significant complexities produced by a convergence between bio-
technological developments capable of transforming the very conditions of life itself,1 climate-
change pressures and the threat of the collapse of bio-diversity and eco-systems, and intensifying 
global inter-dependencies deepening vulnerability on a whole set of scales and measures.2   
 
Law itself is a dominant sphere of social coordination within and through which patterns of 
complexity and inter-dependence emerge.  Increasingly dense regulatory networks and inter-
permeations at all levels between systems and sub-systems of juridical norms in the context of 
globalisation infinitely complicate past assumptions concerning the very conceptual possibility of 
drawing clean legal boundaries – and render, as Twining has argued – the standard and somewhat 
‘black-box’ assumptions of traditional jurisprudence inapt.3 An almost dizzying range of factors are 
now understood to generate or multiply legal relations or, minimally, as being ‘relevant to analysis of 
patterns of legal and law-related relations in the modern world’.4  Neat systemic delineations – even 
those traditionally conceived of as internal to law, such as clean ‘boundaries’ between systems of 
legal norms – are now extensively problematised by legal interpenetrations (‘inter-legalities’5), law’s 
multiple scenes and contexts and heterogeneity. 6   Such complex, hybrid and diverse juridical 
patterns form an analogue to the structural complexities visible in biotechnological developments, in 
new hybridities and the numerous contemporary theoretical and practical manifestations of 
heterogeneity, multiplicity and complexity emerging in a range of disciplines, including cybernetics, 
techno-theory, post-humanism and ecology.7   
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This burgeoning complexity directly impinges upon reflections concerning legal personhood, for it is 
precisely in their light and in response to a growing awareness of their potential implications, along 
with deepening concerns over climate change, animal suffering and widespread ecological 
degradation that the subject of law’s subject has become a topic of growing contemporary concern.8  
The present reflection is but one contingent contribution to a broadening debate concerning the 
extension of legal standing, legal personhood and legal rights subjectivity to a growing range of 
putative beneficiaries and claimants, ranging from non-human animals; to entire species; to trees; to 
the climate itself and to post-human entities such as artificial intelligences and robots.9   
 
The larger project to which this reflection is devoted demands, arguably, the construction of a 
general theory of legal subjectivity possessing the plasticity and responsiveness required by 
contemporary developments and challenges.  While an important element of such a general theory 
of legal subjectivity will be the provision of a theoretically consistent justificatory foundation for the 
extension of legal subjectivity to putative new candidates,10 this article focuses primarily upon the 
theoretical question of the form of legal subjectivity – a vital, frequently overlooked subject11 with 
decisively important implications.12  The argument to be offered here builds upon Naffine’s 2003 
analysis of the existing available constructs of law’s subject,13 nuancing it in order to explore how 
legal subjectivity can be constructed so as to be theoretically flexible enough to respond to 
complexity and to include a wide (and possibly unpredictable) range of putative claimants. 
Simultaneously, this account emphasises the importance of drawing attention to the limitations of 
legal subjectivity in such a way as to extend better protection to those people and beings 
systematically disadvantaged by its currently dominant form.   
 
The exploration here will take the following structure: some preliminary clarifications and general 
notes will be offered concerning the terminology of law’s ‘persons’. This will be followed by the 
introduction and development of Naffine’s three templates of legal personhood, supplemented by 
fuller theorisation and argument.  Finally, conclusions will be offered concerning the utility and 
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promise of seeing the legal subject as an explicit (and explicitly limited) constructus, which highlights 
law’s limits and the inadequacy its constructs to the complex, organic, shifting, embodied, mutable 
and situated affectability of the socio-material and spatio-temporal aliveness woven through, 
beyond and beneath law’s systemic closures.  This simultaneity of attentiveness is fundamental it is 
suggested to the production of a theory of legal personhood responsive to the complex challenges 




Some preliminary terminological clarifications14  
In theoretical discussions of legal subjectivity different terms are used, sometimes even 
interchangeably.  Writers variously refer to legal persons, legal personality, legal subjects (and 
subjectivity) and legal entities.  Accordingly, it will be of some assistance to draw some preliminary 
distinctions between these terms, and to indicate which terminology will be preferred here.   
 
As a preliminary matter, we should note that whilst in mainstream legal theory and doctrine the 
term ‘legal person’ is generally taken to refer to the corporation and the term ‘natural person’ to 
refer to the human being, there is a broad sense in which the term ‘legal person’ also has a more 
generic inference and can also be taken to mean something like ‘law’s person/s’15 – a category which 
includes law’s ‘natural person’.  Moreover, the term ‘person’ has almost inseparable links with the 
idea of the human person and related theories of human personality. Indeed, on some accounts 
there is virtually an overlap between law’s ‘person’ and a notion of humanity, and within 
mainstream legal doctrine the so-called ‘natural person’ of law is without exception considered to be 
of human genetic origin.16 (In this sense it is perhaps more accurately described as ‘the human legal 
person’.)  
 
The considerable degree of convergence between the language and concepts of personhood and of 
humanity exerts considerable semantic traction, even upon the term ‘legal person’ notwithstanding 
its deployment within mainstream legal doctrine to refer (predominantly) to the corporation.  Even 
in the field of corporate personality theory, this anthropomorphic tendency is lamented for its 
obfuscating effects and the confusion generated.17  The anthropomorphic traction exerted by the 
concept and language of the ‘person’ and its inferences also explains, to a significant extent, 
attempts to incorporate non-human animal rights claims within a general appeal to ‘human rights’,18  
and is further implicated in the development of ‘corporate human rights’ discourse and the 
emergence of ‘corporate legal humanity’.19   
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A range of terms are deployed in theoretical discussions of legal subjectivity, in varying ways. Some 
writers use the terms ‘legal person’ and ‘legal personality’ interchangeably. Others draw a distinction 
between them.  Derham, for example, distinguishes between ‘ the constant unit in the logic of a 
legal system’ (the rights-bearing-unit designated as ‘person’) and ‘legal personality as referring to 
the sum total of the legal relations, actual or potential, of a legal person’.20 Accordingly, legal persons 
can be understood to possess differing legal personalities – a distinction which, moreover, renders 
intelligible the idea of varying ‘categories’ of legal person.  The term ‘legal subject’ also has more 
than one referent.  Some writers use the term to indicate the kind of subject or subjectivity 
constructed by law (in terms, say, of its putative ‘rationality’, or other characteristics, such as 
wilfulness or acquisitiveness).21  Other writers simply use it as the semantic equivalent of the term 
‘person’.  Nekam, for example, deploys the term ‘legal subject’ to mean simply a unit (whether a 
plant, an animal, a human being, a spirit, or a group) regarded as important enough to merit juridical 
protection and thus to be the subject of legal rights22 – a definition which renders the ‘legal subject’ 
coterminous with the ‘legal person’ and constituted by the bearing of legal rights.  While the legal 
subject and legal rights presuppose one another,23 the substantive content of this relationship is also 
prone to various alternate readings depending upon the theoretical framework deployed.  For the 
kind of account that Nekam offers, the subject-of-rights character of a thing says nothing about its 
intrinsic or subtending qualities, whereas for others, the notion of a rights-bearer inevitably implies 
inherent characteristics, such as rationality, dignity or autonomy – and above all, for some theorists, 
humanity.   
 
For the purpose of the argument to follow, I will generally deploy Nekam’s preferred terminology of 
the ‘legal entity’, and will defend a related conception of the legal subject which moves legal 
subjectivity away from concepts of personhood towards a more agnostic, formal construct 
functioning as a system referent.  It is worth pointing out some advantages of the terminological 
choice just indicated, some of which foreshadow arguments in support of the theoretical choice to 
be defended in this article.  First, the term ‘legal entity’ has an advantage over the term ‘legal 
person’ in so far as it suggests a semantic aperture arresting – as it were – the inevitability of the 
convergence between legal subjectivity and humanity, thus usefully applying a semantic brake to the 
anthropomorphism haunting discussions of law’s persons.  Secondly, the agnosticism of the term 
‘entity’ has particular utility in semiotic terms because it also readily implies a gap between ‘law’s 
entity’ and any particular underlying something – whether that something is primarily conceived of 
as a being, an entity, a system or a construct. Thirdly, the terminology makes explicit the inescapably 
and inherently constructed nature of the rights-bearing unit of law. Fourthly, the term ‘entity’ avoids 
any intrinsic suggestion of subjectivity in the sense of a self-reflective consciousness and/or other 
incidents taken to constitute the modern notion of the subject/ person (whether human, animal or 
intelligent machine) more broadly understood.  Fifthly, and perhaps more obliquely, the term 
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‘entity’, depending upon its deployment, suggests the important distinction, often overlooked, 
between legal rights and moral rights, legal personhood and moral personhood.24   
 
Some general notes on the existing theoretical approaches 
 
It will be helpful in developing the argument here to locate it within an introductory account of 
existing approaches to the construction of law’s ‘persons’, which tend to reflect two broad positions.  
The first position is broadly ‘naturalistic’ in orientation25 and is represented by those theorists who 
see law’s person as being archetypally a ‘natural’ person (the human being).  The second position is 
broadly positivist, and adopts a conception of law’s rights-bearing unit in the more functionalist or 
formal sense to be favoured (with certain caveats) for the purposes of this argument.   
 
In naturalistic accounts, the legal person is always linked to a subtending natural person, and that 
natural person (the ‘natural person’ of law) is of human genetic origin.26 This ‘natural’ (human) 
subject is, moreover, conceptualised as being in possession of certain intrinsic qualities (such as 
‘dignity’, ‘autonomy’ or ‘rationality’) – and is normally a person (paradigmatically, an adult) for 
whom legal rights function to augment or to provide public recognition of an underlying nature.  
Legal rights, on this view, operate as a kind of overlay upon an underlying set of characteristics taken 
to render such rights both apposite and intelligible.  Human rights, for example, (read as both 
‘moral’ and ‘legal’ rights) are deemed inherent to this natural subject and are understood to proceed 
directly, to borrow Kinley’s language, from the ‘natural condition of being a human’.27  This ‘natural’ 
subject forms the site at which the conflation between legal personhood and humanity is most 
explicit and intractable. 
 
It is worth noting that the study of legal personhood as it applies to humans, once a key theoretical 
field of inquiry, is now ‘no longer … the subject of sustained theoretical analysis’.28  Indeed, Berg has 
gone so far as to claim that ‘legal personhood has largely been ignored outside of the corporate 
context’, this despite the fact that many philosophers and concerned advocates have grappled 
explicitly with the meaning and implications of moral personhood in relation to extending legal 
rights to animals and other non-human beneficiaries.29 The general neglect of legal personhood, and 
in particular, of the human legal person, is a significant omission.  First, the neglect of law’s 
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construction of the natural person is significant because naturalistic suppositions are frequently in 
play in contemporary debate:  When animal rights arguments draw links between rights and moral 
status, for example, and call upon a range of related justificatory concerns implied by the concept of 
being ‘a person’, they draw to an extent upon naturalistic suppositions – albeit modified.  Secondly, 
despite the overwhelming dominance of naturalistic assumptions and the power of the convergence 
between the ‘person’ and the ‘human being’ in law, the ‘natural person’ of law does not adequately 
represent the human being qua human being. The perceived anthropocentrism/morphism of law (so 
often the target of animal-rights-based or eco-centric critiques of law) is far removed from being a 
concern with human beings in any rich and inclusive sense, as will be argued below, and the 
exclusions of approaches adopted in the name of ‘nature’ require particular critical attention in an 
age in which the very idea of the ‘nature’ itself stands so thoroughly problematised.30   
 
The positivist account, by contrast, insists upon the ‘emptiness’ or ‘formality’ of the term legal 
‘person’ as a referent without particular content or reference to sub-tending socio-material, moral, 
political or metaphysical characteristics.  For positivist theorists, the concept of law’s ‘person’ 
functions broadly as a formal reference to whatever law designates as bearing legal ‘entity-status’.  
Derham, for example, explains that ‘*j+ust as the concept ‘one’ in arithmetic is essential to the logical 
system developed and yet is not one something (eg: apple or orange, etc.), so a legal system... must 
be provided with a basic unit before legal relationships can be devised which will serve the primary 
purpose of organizing the social facts.  The legal person is the unit or entity adopted’.31  While this 
unit is conceived of by some theorists as being a ‘pure’ unit of legal logic conceptually and 
functionally independent of any pre-existing social reality, this independence is in reality, leakier and 
less stable than some accounts would allow, as will be suggested below.  Notwithstanding the need 
to qualify the degree to which this construct can escape or transcend materiality, however, the basic 
deployment of the ‘legal entity’ as a system-referent – a mere ‘unit’ of reference – can function as 
an important critical device providing certain advantages over the naturalistic approach, which 
remains inescapably entangled in the language and concept of the person.   
 
A terminological genealogy of the term ‘person’  
 
The genealogy of the term ‘person’ reveals the origins and development of a (broadly naturalistic) 
confusion in the language and concept of the person – and paradoxically perhaps, underlines the 
fact that the term had an original conceptual clarity and an intrinsic sense of artificiality potentially 
theoretically consistent with an ‘entity’ conception of law’s rights-bearing-unit.   
 
The term ‘person’ began its genealogical journey with an original sense of the ‘mask’– a literal 
translation from the Latin persona.32 Gradually, it attracted a substantive, naturalistic, humanity-
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sovereign, reflective subject, a being with his own self-determining personality’.34   
 
At one time, the more naturalistic implication of the term ‘person’ had existed ‘side by side with 
persona in the original sense of “mask” or “role” or “function”, indeed, both senses are to be found 
in literary and legal writings’.35 The conflation between ‘personhood’ and legal subjectivity arose at a 
later point in history when a degree of convergence in the semantics of ‘personhood’ became 
influential under the influence of Christian theology.  Derham, for example, argues that the  
 
more lasting confusion grew from the attempts of the early Christian theologians to grapple 
with the doctrine of the Trinity in the light of Greek (principally Aristotelian) metaphysics... 
By the sixth century Boethius was able to produce a definition of persona as ‘the 
individuality of a rational being’, and the primary use of the word to refer to the ‘part 
played’ was obscured.  The ambiguity and confusion produced is with us yet.36 
 
Arguably, however, the most complete conflation between personhood and rights-bearing status or 
legal subjectivity was achieved with the historical emergence of liberal individualism.  It was at this 
time that the word ‘person’ was chosen as the ‘terminus technicus to designate the subject of 
rights’.37   With the shift from feudal ‘status’-driven relations to modern social and legal relations 
predicated on ‘contract’, the liberal individual effectively became the fundamental unit of law.38  
Nekam argues that it is precisely with the emergence of individualism that an anthropomorphic 
assumption entered the discourse of the legal entity and the term ‘person’ gained its problematic 
semantic complexity: The ‘person’ had evolved into the designation of the combination of a rights-
bearing legal subject and a human individual (and the physical, psychological and metaphysical 
qualities that human communities think they are justified in assigning to it).39 The legal ‘person’ had 
become the archetypal manifestation, arguably, of naturalist philosophical commitments. 
 
Three identifiable conceptions of law’s entity 
 
Naffine – an exception to the general neglect of the theory of law’s person as it relates to the human 
being – has conducted a careful analysis of existing law and jurisprudence to produce a schematic of 
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three identifiable conceptions of ‘law’s person’ (P1, P2, P3).  Hers is important work, especially in the 
light of the fact that in the main, courts deploy the language of legal or juridical personhood a-
theoretically and without clear agreement on its meaning.40 Naffine’s analytical cartography can also 
be seen as a contribution to the foundations of a more general theory of legal subjectivity – now 
vitally important in the light of the fact that the definitional problem of the law’s person is set to 
become ever more complex in the light of technological, social and intellectual developments,41 as 
noted in the introduction to this article.   
 
The exploration to be offered here deploys Naffine’s broad template as a point of departure for a 
fuller development of an account of the forms of legal subjectivity and their implications. The 
account to be offered here will refer to all three conceptions (including law’s ‘natural’ persons) as 
being constructs or entities.  A distinction will,  however, be drawn between the positivist ‘entity-
entity’ (E-E1 – in which the entity-status of law’s subject as constructus is made explicit) and the two 
naturalistic ‘person-entities’ (P-E2/P-E3 – in which the constructed nature of the entity or conception 
involved is submerged or muted beneath naturalistic assumptions and rhetorical practices).  
Although in some ways it would be simpler to render these E-E and P-E1 and P-E2, the numerical 
designation chosen is an attempt to keep clear the relationship between Naffine’s original analysis 
and this deployment of it. The term ‘person-entity’ is a deliberate if somewhat cumbersome 
reference to the fact that law has an operative conception of a ‘human person’ (P-E2) and of a 
closely related human ‘rational actor’ (P-E3) – and that both of these, despite their naturalistic gloss, 
are constructs.  Both, in their particular but related ways also fail, along highly patterned and 
particularistic lines (as will be argued below) to do full justice to the embodied complexity of human 
life in its rich and messy psychosomatic and socio-somatic matrices – and both, fairly systematically 
and with differing degrees of subtlety, tend to exclude certain categories of human being from being 
paradigm instances of law’s autonomous, individual actor.    
 
Naffine’s analysis of existing theoretical accounts and Anglo-American case law identifies first a 
conception of law’s person (P1) corresponding more or less directly with Nekam’s rights-bearing-
functional-legal-entity (E-E1). This is the ‘legal entity’ as ‘bare analytical construct: ‘nothing more 
than the formal capacity to bear a legal right and so to participate in legal relations’.42 By contrast, 
‘P2’ is the definition applied to the ‘animate being’ and coheres around the legal terminology of ‘any 
reasonable creature in being’ (a quintessentially human designation), resting upon ‘biological and 
metaphysical definitions of humanity’ (P-E2).43 ‘P3’ is the ‘responsible subject,’ or the ‘rational and 
therefore responsible human legal agent or subject – the classic contractor’.44 This construct 
represents the archetypal political and legal actor of liberal theory and is here designated as the 
person-entity P-E3 which takes the form, above all, of the ‘rational human actor’.  Naffine’s analysis 
reveals that E-E1, as we would expect from our brief foray into Nekam’s theoretical argument, need 
not be human at all (and therefore, she suggests, includes the corporation).  P-E2 is the conception 
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most intimately related to the biological identification of a natural living human being, while P-E3 
further constricts the legal construct of the underlying human being by elevating a characteristic 
(rationality) (itself read in a particular way) taken to qualify someone for the status of ‘person’.  This 
has the result that, as we move from E-E1 to P-E2 to P-E3 ‘there is a progressive exclusion of beings 
from the privileged status of person and thus the legal circle or legal community steadily 
diminishes.’45 We can also add that there is a subtle and complex movement from explicit artificiality 




E-E1, as the ‘formal capacity to bear a legal right and so to participate in legal relations’ is essentially 
‘empty’.  Anything can be a legal entity because ‘legal *entities+ are stipulated as such or defined into 
existence’.46 This means that E-E1 is highly plastic and, in theoretical terms at least, potentially 
limitless in its reach.  E-E1-type accounts of legal subjectivity also make explicit the fact that the 
‘human being’, as such, is in the context of law nothing more than the sets of legal relations 
addressing or applied to a subtending human referent.  For Kelsen, for example, the legal entity is 
nothing more than a point of convergence for norms – an empty placeholder in a nexus of legal 
relations, not a tangible ‘something’ or ‘anything’ in an everyday sense.  Kelsen’s legal person is ‘the 
unity of a complex of legal obligations and rights.  Since these obligations and rights are constituted 
by legal norms (more correctly: are these legal norms), the problem of “person” is in the last analysis 
the problem of the unity of a complex of norms’.47  The implication of this in relation to the ‘human 
being’ is that the ‘so-called physical person ... is not a human being, but the personified unity of the 
legal norms that obligate or authorise one and the same human being’.48  The gap between the legal 
entity and the human being – or indeed any subtending anything – is made explicit on such an 
account.  
 
The E-E1 conception of the legal entity, moreover, is infinitely malleable.  On an E-E1 account, law 
can explicitly multiply both the entities it creates and variations in the relations between them, 
lending E-E1 considerable plasticity.  The E-E1 facility for multiple extensions of legal status, taken 
seriously, implies that E-E1 could stand for a convergence of norms directed towards a human being, 
an animal, a corporation, a system, a sub-system – even at a micro-scalar level of focus  – indeed, for 
almost anything – theoretically at least.  Naffine rightly points out that, although E-E1 might appear 
to be the ‘least interesting, most colourless and abstractly formal type of legal person’49 the very 
blankness of the entity is precisely what grounds an account of legal subjectivity responsive to a 
wide range of putative candidates.  Furthermore, E-E1’s agnosticism and plasticity – its ‘artificiality’ – 
can be emphasised to advertise, almost as an immanent characteristic of its linguistic and 
conceptual constitution, its own contingent, malleable, constructed nature.  This malleability gives E-
E1 a certain potential responsiveness to complexity, moreover.  It is not locked into any particular 
pre-existing form – it is protean and can evolve in response to law’s changing needs. E-E1 ‘fits’, as it 
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were, the need for plasticity in an age of plasticity.  It offers a useful construct through which to 
mediate law’s own necessary plastic organisation as a system – fluid, open, potentially adaptive to a 
wide range of future imperatives.   
 
The E-E1 conception has a further important advantage, however. It has the advantage of being 
amenable to critical deployments drawing attention to the gap between E-E1 and the living, 
malleable affectability of socio-materiality implicated in law’s coordinative task.  In an age of 
mounting pressure concerning the endangerment of animals, eco-systems and so forth, E-E1 
possesses a theoretically flexible, virtually unlimited potential for multiplying law’s entities while 
usefully, and  simultaneously, pointing to law’s strategies and limits.  (The advantages of this will 
become particularly clear when we examine the negative implications of P-E2 and P-E3, below.) 
 
E-E1’s relationship with socio-materiality is somewhat complex.  Quite apart from its prospective 
lack of independence from emergent justificatory arguments for the production of new legal entities 
arising from ‘beyond law’s artificiality’ in arguments about vulnerability, moral personhood and the 
like, E-E1 is attended by interesting theoretical questions concerning the degree to which it can 
avoid materialisation once it is put to work in the legal system.50  Materialisation seems inescapable 
given law’s nature as practical reasoning designed to coordinate relations and yield outcomes in a 
socio-materially ‘thick’ world.  Legal norms and constructs, after all, have an inherently ‘non-law’ 
facing nature.51  They possess an intrinsic orientation towards the socio-material and all jural 
constructs can be seen to implicate a ‘flesh-and-blood’ dimension.  Even the most explicitly fictive 
elements of law, the most notionally spectral of juristic creations (those emerging in the 
‘contemplation of’ the mind of law alone52) have inescapably generative effects in socio-material 
terms: they ‘act’ on the world, sooner or later, as a direct result of (and possibly even as a condition 
for) their deployment as categories of legal thought or conceptualisation.   Nekam goes further, 
arguing that the legal entity is also ‘always something in whose experimental (by which he seems to 
mean empirical) existence the community believes’, although he insists that the ‘legal entity’ is only 
the legal image of this empirical something because the legal entity will only possess those 
characteristics with which the law imbues it, and, accordingly, that ‘all the other eventual qualities of 
the beneficiary will be totally immaterial from *the law’s+ point of view’. 53   
 
However, Nekam’s view arguably underplays the implications of the question of the shape of the 
‘immateriality’ excluded by law, overstating the degree to which the characteristics grounded in the 
empirical/socio-material can ever be truly immaterial to the construction of law’s entity.  Naffine has 
argued that in their insistence on the idea of the legal entity as a formal concept, it is possible that 
positivist accounts have ‘demonstrated a wilful blindness’ to the empirical character of law’s 
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personification and have thereby inhibited the possibility of fertile theoretical dialogue on the 
subject, removing, moreover, the ‘analysis of the legal person from its socio-political context’54 and 
occluding examination of the socio-political function of legal personhood.55  She suggests that 
positivist theorists have generally ‘tended to cease their theorising at the very point at which it 
becomes most interesting and so have simply not engaged with the question of the form of law’s 
personification’.56   
 
From a critical point of view, the form of E-E1’s personification is a question that will require on-
going and reflexive engagement if E-E1 is to fulfil the inclusory promise of its artificiality, malleability 
and relative agnosticism.  It will be important to examine E-E1’s forms of materialisation and to draw 
attention to precisely what or who might be ‘othered’ by law’s commitments as mediated through 
the construct.  It is of particular note, for example, that existing critical accounts suggest a highly 
patterned selectivity in relation to the characteristics of the empirical ‘something’ that law is willing 
to deploy or acknowledge as a legal subject  – a patterned selectivity moreover reflecting identifiable 
characteristics and suppositions concerning the particularities of ‘natural’ human being of law, 
revealed when E-E1 materialises – as it historically has tended to– as P-E3.57 Unless this tendency is 
transcended, E-E1 cannot begin to achieve the radically inclusory potential of its ‘emptiness’.  But 
even in some future world where (perhaps implausibly) the tendency to manifest as P-E3 is 
successfully overcome, the question of the patterns of E-E1’s materialisation can never be put aside.  
The question of materialisation will always require epistemic and critical vigilance – a persistent, 
justice-sensitive engagement with the question of precisely what or who is ‘othered’ by the 
materialisation of even this most promisingly agnostic of conceptions of the legal entity.58   
 
E-E1, I suggest, offers particularly rich possibilities from the critical point of view.  Its insistence on 
the fact that law’s entity is but a  constructus made up of intersecting normative relations within 
law’s systemic thought-stream is a potentially most powerful way of rendering naked, as it were, the 
systemic gap between law and complex, dynamic, relationally-productive materialities.  The very 
artificiality of the constructus  as explicit constructus opens up an intelligible space for critique, 
inviting a new level of vigilance concerning the forms and implications of the materialisation of E-E1. 
E-E1’s artificiality highlights, I suggest, a useful critical gap obscured or missing in naturalistic 
accounts of law’s subject, tending – as they do – to reify a ‘natural’ construct in a way masks its 
artificiality, selectivity and partiality.  
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 P-E2  
 
Naffine, as already noted, also identifies two templates of the ‘natural person’ in law: P2 (P-E2) and 
P3 (P-E3).  Both these constructs presuppose a ‘natural human being’ as the substrate of the 
‘person’ in law and rest on operative suppositions concerning ‘an intrinsic’ human nature.  P-E2 
theories focus most directly, according to Naffine, upon the simple ‘natural condition of being 
human’ in law.59   This ‘human’ is legally defined – and rests upon certain biological and metaphysical 
assumptions concerning the meaning of being ‘human’, or counting as ‘human’.  The position 
presupposes a living human being and a human being becomes a legal being in the P-E2 sense ‘at 
birth, which is also legally defined, and stops being a legal person at whole brain death, legally 
defined’.60  As Naffine points out, in such accounts, legal rights are seen as a mere augmentation of 
what are taken to be innate moral attributions of ‘natural’ persons.  
 
This conception of law’s entity is arguably the most complex in its relationship with legal 
anthropocentrism and has been described as being ‘almost axiomatic’ for human rights lawyers.61  
Naffine notes, for example, that Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the 
paradigmatic statement of P-E2.  A closer examination of human rights law, however, even at the 
putatively ‘human-family’-centred international level, reveals certain patterned (some would say, 
predictable) closures at play.62   P-E2 is, in a sense, meant to stand for all of us, yet the commitments 
underlying the construct have been convincingly linked, by a range of critical scholars, to the 
replication of hierarchies and marginalised subjectivities even within international human rights law 
(that most ‘human being’ centred of all legal regimes).63   P-E2 relies on biological definitions of the 
human – and melds biology  (itself extensively constructed and bearing an oppressive social 
history64) with overtly metaphysical assumptions65 identified by critical accounts as bearing  
problematic implications linked to exclusory assumptions underlying the disembodied conception of 
the autonomous person (both philosophical and legal).66  These self-same assumptions and 
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exclusions are linked by such accounts to the very epistemologies and practices of ecological 
destructiveness67 now animating concerns for the extension of legal subjectivity to animals and the 
environment.  In fact, a range of critical accounts of P-E2 suggestively imply that installed within its 
cognitive architecture is a highly particular, gendered, raced construct.68 This critique has produced, 
for example, various feminist strategies (reconstructing the universal as a double subjectivity,69  
particularising the masculine70  and inverting existing gender scripts71), none of which, to date, have 
successfully solved the fundamental exclusory quandary presented by P-E2.  On closer examination, 
moreover, especially in its instantiation as the abstract universal, the closures of P-E2 are intimately 
related to the contours of the P-E3 conception of the ‘natural’ legal subject. Thus, while P-E2 is more 
potentially inclusive of human beings than the P-E3 conception, its socio-historical implications have 
not been inclusive despite its universalistic aspirations, rhetoric and (some would say) pretensions.  
In short, P-E2 (just as E-E1) has, in its materialisation, tended to reveal the overwhelming dominance 
of the P-E3 construct of law’s person/entity and, as a result, international human rights law fails, as 
Otto notes, to fulfil its most fundamental premise: its commitment to the ‘whole human family’ and 
to the principle of non-discrimination,72 such that, as Douzinas has argued, ‘*o+nce the slightest 
empirical or historical material is introduced into abstract human nature, once we move from the 
declarations onto the concrete embodied person, with gender, race, class and age, human nature 
with its equality and dignity retreats rapidly’.73  
 
Since P-E2 is, in a very real sense, a more subtle manifestation of P-E3, and since E-E1 has, thus far, 
historically tended to materialise as P-E3, it is on P-E3 that we shall focus most of our critical 
attention for present purposes. 
  
P-E3: the autonomous, rational actor 
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P-E3 is a naturalistic construct which further narrows the remit of ‘human’ or ‘natural’ legal 
‘personhood’ by explicitly elevating certain characteristics deemed to be determinative of rights-
bearing capacity and status –drawing out, in a sense, the suppositions of P-E2 more overtly.  P-E3 
places a focal emphasis upon a particular conception of human rationality (narrowly conceived74) 
and the ‘mentally and legally competent human adult’75 supplies its operative trope.  This adult is 
presumptively male: the archetypal rational, choosing, will-exercising ‘discrete possessor of rights’,76  
distinctly bounded and separative.77  This trope has been identified by feminists as being the fully 
autonomous man upon whom legal and political subjectivity is currently overwhelmingly founded.78  
Naffine argues that P-E3 is ‘a conspicuous departure from ordinary-language meanings of the term 
[legal person]. In this sense it is more akin to P1 [/E-E1] than P2 [/P-E2]: it is a technical legal term 
whose meaning may be regarded as interior to law’.79   
 
Despite its putative legal ‘interiority’, however, P-E3 is, in a sense, but the juridical register of a set of 
broader commitments, also reflected in P-E2, and converging in the complex of the political, 
economic and legal actor.  P-E3 has, in this sense, a pervasive presence as a powerfully naturalised 
ideological construction of the ‘human person’ with extensive reach across the entire spectrum of 
social domains.  It represents the quintessence of the ‘rational and therefore responsible human 
legal agent or subject: the classic contractor, the individual who is held personally accountable for 
his civil and criminal actions ...’80whose rational choice founds the liberal political order and 
operatively navigates and structures market-relations. P-E3 has been almost univocally unmasked, 
from a range of critical perspectives, as structurally privileging the white, male, property-owner and 
central-case citizen, the archetypal ‘natural’ man whose civic life emerges from contract and whose 
bounded self is analytically co-dependent with liberalism’s private property construct.81 Naffine 
suggests that P-E3 is also ‘impossibly self-possessed and self-reliant, will-driven, clinically rational 
and individualistic. Certainly he is never pregnant, for this would threaten his physical integrity. Also 
he is not to be thought of as a wife’.82  P-E3, then, appears to be, in many respects, the submerged 
primary beneficiary of law in Western cultures – a point amply supported by the important fact that, 
as has already been noted, both E-E1 and P-E2 tend to materialise as P-E3.  Another way of looking 
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at this materialisation pattern would be to conceptualise P-E3 as reflecting values and commitments 
sub-tending the entire gendered liberal legal schema in its current dominant formulation which 
emerge in differing and sometimes complicated ways in all three constructs of law’s entity. 
Accordingly, all three constructs can be read as being ideologically tilted, though to differing degrees 
– suggesting that legal subjectivity as a mechanism ‘fairly systematically … *supports+… a quite 
particular interpretation of the person.’83 The dominance of P-E3, therefore, suggests that it has a 
particular importance for understanding the present limitations of contemporary legal subjectivity.   
 
Linking P-E3, the exclusions of legal naturalism and the dominance of the corporate form 
 
There are observable trajectories of privilege and oppression linked to the epistemological 
underpinnings, ontological assumptions and ethical failures associated with the P-E3 construction of 
legal subjectivity which have been linked to contemporary forms of injustice and exclusion and to 
the dangers facing human communities, natural ecosystems and the world population as a whole.84 
In this light, the dominance of P-E3 is an important subject for proponents of extending legal 
subjectivity to animals and the environment to consider. It seems essential that such proponents 
should fully appreciate critiques of the contemporary constitution of legal subjectivity and address 
its gravitational tendencies towards patterned forms of privilege and oppression. Proponents of 
animal and environmental rights, for example, frequently attack the  ‘anthropocentrism’ of law, 
arguing that law (perhaps especially human rights law) amounts to a form of ‘philosophical 
speciesism’.85  However, the dominance of P-E3 (and the intimately related exclusions of P-E2) 
suggest that legal anthropocentrism does not straightforwardly elevate ‘human interests’ at all so 
much as elevate a particular construct of the human person which systematically advantages those  
best able to deploy some relevant degree of correspondence to it.  It is not going too far to suggest 
that both P-E2 and P-E3 fail to embrace an ‘anthropos’ in any sense that guarantees the inclusion of 
the living human being qua human being.  Indeed, this radical failure of inclusion is one of the most 
telling criticisms levelled at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that putatively most 
‘humanity-centred’ declaration of humanitarian concern.86 It is arguably vital for those concerned to 
extend legal subjectivity to animals and the environment, or indeed to other beings, entities or 
systems, to attend to the fact that P-E3 retains a stubborn centrality in law – this notwithstanding 
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the broader cultural impact of post-structural, post-humanist and bio-technological insights into the 
instability of humanity as a category.  It is especially important to recall that P-E3 (and to a more 
muted extent P-E2) is a construct which has historically deployed an incipient categorisation of 
human beings into hierarchies of rationality and dignity – a hierarchy which has effectively excluded 
an entire range of ‘non-dominant’ humans87 – operatively uniting them, in fact, with non-human 
animals88 and other living systems from the full protective concern of the law.89   
 
P-E3 continues to operate as a decisively important and problematic ‘insider-outsider’ mechanism, 
albeit often in more complex ways than it did in less notionally equality-sensitive social eras.  Unless 
the dominance of P-E3 is addressed, it is likely that strategies for the extension of legal subjectivity 
run the genuine risk of a dangerous naivety.  Critical legal accounts sensitive to the socially 
contingent and paradoxical nature of both rights and legal subjectivity assume a far less benign 
relationship between law and protection than do most arguments for the extension of rights or legal 
subjectivity to putative new claimants.  The relative lack of engagement, noted by Berg, with 
questions of legal personhood beyond the issue of corporate personhood,90 (and compared to 
arguments addressing the moral personhood of animals, the environment, intelligent machines and 
so forth) presents a theoretical omission in urgent need of exploration.   
 
P-E3 stands at the heart of many critical accounts of legal subjectivity.  So too does a dense intimacy 
between liberal law and capitalism. Indeed, a range of accounts suggest liberal legality 
(characterised by the primacy of contract and property rules within a formally equality-based 
juridical framework) as being ‘the mechanism by which capital dominates civil society’.91 Let us 
attend more closely to this suggestion and its implications in relation to the ‘identity’ of P-E3, its 
‘others’, and its implications in the contemporary contexts now driving the debate about extending 
legal subjectivity.  
 
The broad argument that law is the mechanism by which capital dominates civil society has been 
particularly linked to critical readings of the nineteenth century period in which capitalism became 
the dominant mode of production.92 It has been argued, for example, that modern science and 
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modern law were produced as related facets of a rationalistic discourse93 which tended to cloak the 
exclusionary implications of the elevation of P-E3 as the proto-beneficiary of a capitalist legal and 
political order.  It has been suggested that ‘the violence at the heart of law and of public and private 
power, which had helped re-organise the world according to the new political and economic 
orthodoxies, was written out of the texts of the law’,94 and that law was re-constituted as a 
supremely rational state product in a socio-temporal context in which the disciplinary power of the 
state was united with science to produce new forms of social control, as Foucault so brilliantly 
argued.95 Law was re-imagined, idealised as a rational, technical formalism aimed at logical 
coherence, seamless coverage and certainty which, for Weber at least, amounted to a form of 
‘domination’ ‘legitimated by the rational system of state-enacted universal and abstract laws, 
presiding over a bureaucratic and professional administration, and applied throughout society 
through a form of justice based on logical formal rationality’.96  Santos argues that ‘the rise of 
positivism in the epistemology of modern science and the rise of legal positivism in law and 
jurisprudence belong together as ideological constructs aimed at reducing social progress to 
capitalistic development’.97   
 
Capitalistic development in the decisive nineteenth century time frame has particular implications 
relating to a marked intimacy between P-E3 and the corporate form, the dominance of which has 
had,98 and continues to have a decisive impact upon the ‘others’ of P-E3 legal subjectivity.99 It is 
important to note as a preliminary matter that P-E3 ideology is thoroughly implicated in the 
nineteenth century consolidation of the power of the emergent capitalist class. Norrie’s account of 
the reconstruction of English criminal law in the nineteenth century,100 for example, reveals their 
relentless priority in the modernisation project of the law reformers.  It also reveals law’s attempted 
excision of social context in the search for a pure application of legal rationalism, and the analytically 
co-dependent hypostatisation of P-E3 in the context of criminal law – a convergence of elements 
ultimately revealing the patterned, socially-constructed limits of legal rationality itself.101 It is 
Norrie’s explicit contention that the criminal law was developed by the nineteenth century criminal 
law reformers precisely to safeguard emergent propertied interests.102 A central consequence of the 
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new ‘objective’ criminal laws deployed in this process was the production, Norrie argues, of a 
knowing individual subject who could be held fully responsible for his actions.  P-E3 can be seen as, 
in a sense, a translation of the individualist ideology of the intellectual spokesmen of the period (the 
political economists) into a juridical subject perfectly matched to the needs of the emerging 
capitalist economic order. A knowing criminal legal subject constructed as a paradigmatically free 
individual fully able to calculate his own interests and fully responsible for his actions functioned – in 
part – to occlude from the question of legal responsibility any meaningful consideration of the often 
violently exclusive structural conditions of a rapidly capitalising society.103  P-E3, in this light, can be 
read as the figuration of a fully capitalistic legal subjectivity, one key function of which was to hold 
the newly constituted industrial poor fully responsible for their actions in a way that excised from 
view the structural causes of their socio-economic disadvantage.  P-E3 thus performed a dual 
function.  As a hypostatisation of homo economicus/homo juridicus it operated as a facilitative 
adjunct to the market,104 while simultaneously rendering individuals newly accountable to the 
strictures of capitalistic law. The construct, moreover, selectively (and incompletely) dis-embedded 
individuals from social circumstance and structural context, perhaps most especially those 
circumstances or contexts which might explain their actions or motivations on the basis of socio-
material necessity.105  The legal subject thus produced and installed within the criminal law of the 
nineteenth century was a translation of the economically astute market-actor into the P-E3 criminal 
subject whose calculations of costs and benefits of crime and punishment were amply reflected in 
the development of utilitarian theories of deterrent punishment.106  The law reformers imagined a 
world populated by atomistic individuals operating freely in consensual relationships. Both market 
and law were conceived of as zones of rational exchange and neutrality between putatively equal 
male actors rather than as conflict-ridden sites of power struggle, yet despite the fact that 
‘*i+ndividualistic ideological abstractions triumphed over bitter social realities … the realities did not 
thereby obligingly disappear’.107   
 
Norrie’s analysis readily implies that the formation of liberal capitalism in the nineteenth century is 
aptly described as setting in motion ‘the social process of exclusion and the concentration of 
modernity’.108  Law and legal theory played a crucial role in this process, systematically suppressing 
the gap between the violent inequalities of the emergent social relations and the smooth juridical 
production of social relations as putatively regularised, fully consensual and fully rational.109  As 
Norrie points out, 
[i]n legal theory, the contradictions were kept at bay so long as the logic of abstract 
individualism and the myths of the political economy were adhered to.  In theory, each 
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individual was the same as every other.  All were potential possessors of property rights, all 
potential offenders against them.  That in reality the possessors and the offenders came 
from different social classes constituted hardly a ripple on the millpond of theory.110 
 
P-E3, placed in this light, functions as a ‘caricature of the real person’.111  The gap visible between P-
E3 and the complexity of socially-located, embodied, affectively complex human beings takes the 
form of ‘both excess and lack, and becomes fully visible when people start legal proceedings’.112 The 
excess is constituted by the law’s ascription to the subject of an extreme rationalism. In terms of 
lack, P-E3 is complexly and incompletely disembodied, decontextualised, devoid of a complex 
emotional interiority – and its formulation as just such an entity is precisely what produces and re-
produces its highly particularistic, patterned exclusions.  P-E3 represents, to borrow the words of 
Schlag, a radical juridical ‘emancipation of the self from its contexts’ enabling the legal subject ‘to be 
emancipated from all forces and influences other than law itself’.113  P-E3, despite its naturalist gloss, 
is little more than ‘metaphysical or calculating, self-interested being, conceived in an asocial way in a 
world whose sociality was no more than the coming together of individuals in a social contract... the 
law [knows]no real individuals, only their mystical abstractions’.114   
 
The P-E3 ‘natural person’ is best conceptualised as an entity, a cipher – a socio-juridical projection, 
hypostatised in complex ways, but ultimately, a cipher that ‘represents’ (more accurately 
misrepresents) a notion of an underlying human person (itself a social construct in important and 
central respects).  Arguably, it is the corporation, not the human being, which most closely 
approximates P-E3. The corporation is quintessentially disembodied and also the ultimate 
personification of market imperatives, presenting a form of subjectivity that perfectly fits, expresses, 
facilitates and perhaps even intensifies the priorities of capitalism itself.  Examining law’s ideological 
tilt towards the priority of P-E3 through the lens of personification115 underlines the corporation as 
the ultimate manifestation of P-E3.  Again, the nineteenth century emerges as the decisive period, 
for this was the period in which the corporate form emerged when company law (like criminal law) 
was modernised.   
 
Neocleous argues that ‘what is at stake in the process of personification [are] the juridical as well as 
the socio-economic conditions which enable things to appear as non-human persons’,116  and that 
personification has been decisive for the entrenchment of the social power of corporate capital.  
Indeed, P-E3 legal subjectivity and the mechanism of personification can be seen as complex but 
crucial conduits for the contemporary juridical dominance of the corporate form.117 Ironically, anti-
capitalist resistance to corporate power barely ever focuses on the corporate form despite its crucial 
role in lending the corporation particular advantages within the capitalist scheme of modern law. 
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Significantly, the decision of the English House of Lords in Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd,118 which as 
Neocleous suggests is the case that ‘formally defined and recognised the private company as the 
legal form of capital’,119  has been credited with establishing the constitutive preconditions of the 
corporate conglomerates which are now so dominant in the context of neoliberal globalisation.120 
The historic significance of the Salomon case, therefore, for the ‘intensification of capital 
accumulation was enormous. [It forged] a special legal subjectivity for capital, arising from the 
nature of capital itself’.121   
 
Just as anti-capitalist resistance to corporate power has not focused closely enough, in general, upon 
the corporate form, so few arguments for extending legal subjectivity to new claimants locate their 
concerns against a critical engagement with the either the juridical dominance of the corporate form 
or the intimately related implications of P-E3 as the predominant form of legal subjectivity.  Yet the 
corporation’s emergence as ‘a new and independent legal subject, every bit as real in law as the new 
personal subjects of the classic legal form …’122 has been decisive in its implications and is likely to 
remain so for all candidates for future legal subjectivity – including animals (which have been starkly 
instrumentalised since the advent of industrial and then corporate capitalism123) and the 
environment.  (Indeed, it was recently suggested that corporate power is now the most significant 
block to progress on climate change goals.124) 
 
It seems important to emphasise, relatedly, that ‘fit’ with P-E3 is impossible for most, if not all, 
human beings (despite the fact that certain human beings (white, propertied males) clearly benefit 
from some kind of approximate correspondence with it). The critical accounts discussed here of the 
great reforming projects in commercial and criminal law shed important light on the ideological 
architecture of P-E3.  The work of Neocleous and Norrie, taken together, suggestively indicates 
powerful linkages between the construction of the ‘natural’ P-E3 juridical subject and the way in 
which the corporation has emerged as a seamless match with the capitalistic commitments driving 
the socio-historical developments of the nineteenth century.   This linkage  is becomes explicit in 
Federman’s account of the virtually simultaneous (or even paired)construction of corporate and 
criminal persons in America 125  when corporations broke away from the state to take increasing 
advantage of the benefits of personification – including, notably, within constitutional rights 
discourse.126 Federman argues that  ‘*f+or the first time in American constitutional law, the legal 
person takes shape not simply as a bearer of traditional English liberties, with all that implies 
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regarding personal autonomy, but as a corporate “person”, who is not dissimilar to the bearer of 
traditional English liberties, and yet is structurally different’.127    
 
Corporations have taken increasing power and priority within legal discourse, reaching even into the 
constitutional and human rights discourse paradigmatically aimed at the P-E3 construct of the 
‘human citizen’ (and in the case of human rights, P-E2 (P-E3’s complexly analogous construct)).128  
The corporation fits the complex, incomplete disembodiment of P-E3 in a way that the vast majority 
of concrete, embodied, socially-situated human beings simply cannot.  This difference alone gives 
the corporate form a distinct advantage over the living human being and over non-human animals 
and the environment, for P-E3 is particularly ill-suited to embodied, situated complexities.129  This 
poor fit becomes particularly pronounced, however, in relation to the ‘others’ of P-E3 and P-E2. P-
E3’s detailed contours, as Naffine’s analysis and numerous critical readings of the socio-historic and 
contemporary exclusions of legal subjectivity suggest, exclude all those human beings who do not or 
cannot fit its template: all those predictable ‘outsiders’ forming the traditional targets for hate-
speech and/or discrimination of various kinds, reflecting well-rehearsed patterns of injustice long 
associated with Anglo-American citizenship.130   
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The continuity between P-E3 and the corporate form of capital reflexively emphasises the 
constructed and highly selective nature of the ‘natural person’ putatively represented by P-E3 and P-
E2 (to a more muted extent).  This powerfully naturalised construct presents, it is suggested, 
considerable challenges for anyone concerned to see legal subjectivity become genuinely more 
inclusive and has a limited potential to transcend its constructed naturalism in order to respond to 
the complexities, mutations, hybridities and multiplicities confronting law in the twenty-first 
century.   
 
One implication of this analysis is that those who seek to extend the ambit of legal subjectivity to 
embrace putative new forms of claimant should advert with great care to P-E3’s dominance. This is 
especially important in a context where capitalism’s uncanny ability continuously and reflexively to 
adopt the guise and languages of its critiques and counter-values presents a genuine problem.  For 
those seeking rights for animals and nature, for example, it would be salutary to reflect upon the 
fact that the realisation of an order of international human rights for embodied vulnerable human 
beings has been rendered dependent upon the prior recognition of an order of rights for global 
capital131 – and to reflect upon the power of the closures implicated by that reality.  Baxi argues that 
any serious sociological reading of international human rights law now forces the conclusion that 
international human rights have been ‘critically appropriated by global capital’,132 while Evans and 
Ayers conclude that human rights have been effectively ‘co-opted’ by a forcible distortion ‘in 
support of processes associated with capitalist globalisation’.133   This is a bleak assessment.  It is 
further supported by those accounts of ‘sustainable development’ and (its intended critique) 
‘sustainability’ discourse (even within progressive multi-level governance settings) which reveal the 
capture of green agendas by the ideological and procedural dominance of corporate actors.134  Such 
dangers, arguably inherently linked to the dominance of P-E3, both as an ideological and a functional 
matter, should be borne in mind in debates concerning the extension of legal subjectivity.  In 
particular, attention should be paid to the way in which P-E3’s constructed naturalism disguises its 




This argument has underlined the constructed nature of all three templates of law’s entity/person in 
order to underline the critical advantages of emphasising their ‘artificiality’ over continuing to accept 
the constructed naturalism of PE-2 and P-E3. There is a productive (and critically satisfying) sense in 
which law’s conception of the ‘legal person’ is best understood as E-E1, precisely because of its 
explicit emphasis upon its function as a system referent.  Emphasising the necessary ‘artificiality’ of 
law’s ‘entity’ as a constructus, as  E-E1 does, headlines, in a sense, law’s limitations in a way that 
allows the messy materiality subtending and exceeding law’s categories of reference to come into 
fuller view both as a theoretical and as an ethical matter. E-E1, unlike P-E3 and P-E2, is explicit about 
its artificiality.  While doubts can be cast upon E-E1’s ability to remain empty, the construct offers 
the best currently available candidate-conception of law’s entity upon which to found a responsive, 
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suitably complexity-sensitive account of legal subjectivity.  First, E-E1 is highly plastic: Its very 
formality and/or agnosticism, as Naffine points out, means that it can be taken to ‘stand for’ just 
about anything.  Given the dynamic complexities, uncertainties and rapidly multiplying hybrid forms  
inhabiting the socio-materiality within which law performs its coordinating role, such plasticity is not 
only useful, but will become increasingly indispensable.  Secondly, E-E1 has the virtue of already 
being in existence as a concept deployed within law and legal theory.  Suitably rehabilitated, it is, 
therefore, not alien to the courts.  Thirdly, because of its very formality and artificiality as an explicit 
constructus, E-E1 resists, to some extent, the obfuscating traction of the idea of ‘natural 
personhood’ evoked by P-E2 and P-E3.  Simultaneously, because the language of ‘legal entity’ can be 
deployed to replace the language of ‘legal personhood’ it may be possible to shift the semantic 
resonance of law’s referents away from ‘persons’ and ‘humans’ towards a wider range of candidates 
for legal subjectivity.  This potentially allows E-E1 to offer more to theories of legal subjectivity than 
the truncated anthropomorphism so troubling to many and inherent to P-E2 and P-E3.  Fourthly, 
emphasising E-E1’s status as constructus (something always implicit in the term ‘legal entity’) has the 
advantage of pointing, almost ineluctably, towards law’s living excess which emerges dynamically 
from the complex, organic, shifting, embodied, mutable and situated realities of the socio-material, 
spatio-temporal aliveness woven through, beyond and beneath law.   Finally, while E-E1 will be 
forced, as argued above, to materialise – it is possible that by foregrounding E-E1 explicitly against a 
critique of P-E2 and P-E3 we can invite legal theorists to engage with vital questions concerning the 
form of E-E1’s materialisation so fundamental to the search for eco-humane justice in a complex 
age.  
 
 
